

VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #4643 1740215
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 230150Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 064643

SIPDIS
GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2029
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KACT](#) [KTIA](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [US](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA
NEGOTIATIONS ON START FOLLOW-ON TREATY, GENEVA,
SWITZERLAND, JUNE 22-24, 2009

REF: A. STATE 041125
[B](#). STATE 050911
[C](#). STATE 050910
[D](#). STATE 060343
[E](#). STATE 060487
[F](#). STATE 061832
[G](#). MOSCOW 01347
[H](#). GENEVA 00419 (SFO-GVA-I-007)

Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, VCI. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#). (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, is scheduled to head the U.S. delegation in continuing negotiations regarding a START follow-on treaty with Russian MFA Director of Security and Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy Antonov, in Geneva, Switzerland on June 22-24, 2009.

[2](#). (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation may draw from previous guidance and U.S. nonpapers (reftels) to discuss U.S. views relating to a START Follow-on treaty. Delegation is authorized to reach ad referendum agreement on the text of a joint understanding for the July 6-8 U.S.-Russia Summit, containing the U.S. proposals in the draft Joint Understanding provided in Moscow (Ref E). If agreement is not possible on a document containing these U.S. proposals, delegation should work to obtain a bracketed text with the Russian delegation framing the issues that prevent agreement. Delegation should report on all meetings as expeditiously as possible.

[3](#). (S) GUIDANCE, continued: To contribute to the discussion regarding a START Follow-on treaty, Delegation may provide the texts in paragraphs 4-10 below to the Russian Delegation in the form of non-papers. Delegation should inform the Russian Delegation that these papers contain official U.S. responses to the Refs G and H papers that Russia provided in May and early June. If asked whether the U.S. has a response to the Opening Remarks of the Russian Head of Delegation at the May 19 first plenary meeting, Delegation may state that the U.S. believes our response (Ref F) to the Russian Vision paper also addresses the points made in the May 19 Opening Remarks paper.

[4](#). (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of U.S. response to Ref G para 17 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Response to the Russian Paper on "Procedures for Negotiations between the Russian and U.S. Delegations to Draft a New START Follow-on Agreement," dated May 20, 2009

- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation paper from the May 20, 2009, meeting in Moscow entitled

"Procedures for Negotiations between the Russian and U.S. Delegations to Draft a New START Follow-on Agreement."

- The United States agrees with the proposals of the Russian Federation concerning the procedures for drafting the new agreement. The United States notes, however, that it does not consider the procedures and examples provided by the Russian Federation to be exhaustive; additional or alternative procedures, meetings, and forms of documents may be adopted based on mutual agreement throughout the negotiating process.

- The United States agrees that negotiations concerning the START Follow-on agreement will be held in confidence and the United States will protect the information provided to it by the Russian Federation, and will presume the same of the information it provides to the Russian Federation. In this regard, the United States notes that some information presented to the Russian Federation by the United States may be marked SECRET, depending upon its classification level within the parameters of U.S. classification guidance.

- The United States notes that, in response to Russian and U.S. inquiries, the Swiss authorities have already made an offer that would ensure that Heads and Members of delegations, as well as experts, translators, interpreters, and other personnel supporting this work will be able to obtain the necessary visas and status to conduct negotiations in Geneva.

- The United States does not consider that this will in any way have an impact on the possibility of conducting meetings and negotiations in other locations, including Moscow, Washington, D.C., or other sites as mutually agreed.

End text.

15. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of U.S. response to Ref G para 18 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Comments on the Russian Federation Paper "On Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Production Facility for Mobile ICBMs at Votkinsk," dated May 19, 2009

- The United States has reviewed the Russian paper provided during the May 19, 2009, meeting in Moscow.

- The United States believes, as stated in its non-paper of May 19, 2009, "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty," that perimeter and portal continuous monitoring is an example of existing verification provisions in the current START Treaty that should be carried forward in the new treaty.

- Continuous portal monitoring at production facilities of ICBMs for mobile launchers was included in the START Treaty to assist both sides with the difficult task of verifying the number of mobile ICBMs that could be deployed in/on mobile launchers. The United States views portal monitoring at production facilities of ICBMs for mobile launchers as an essential transparency and confidence building measure in the proposed START follow-on treaty. On a reciprocal basis, the United States is willing to discuss additional verification measures to those START measures currently available that would help Russia assess U.S. strategic offensive systems that are identified in the START follow-on treaty.

- As for the draft JCIC Agreement on Principles and Procedures for Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk and the

letters of exchange on the use of ground transportation and settlement of accounts in connection with this provided by the Russian Federation on January 26, 2009, the United States assures the Russian Federation that the United States has studied those documents but believes that it is premature to provide a response at this time.

End text.

¶6. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of U.S. response to Ref G para 21 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On U.S. Plans to Equip ICBMs and SLBMs with Non-Nuclear ("Conventional") Reentry Vehicles," dated May 20, 2009

- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation paper entitled "On U.S. Plans to Equip ICBMs and SLBMs with Non-nuclear ("Conventional") Reentry Vehicles," which was provided at the May 20, 2009, meeting in Moscow.

- The United States cannot agree to the Russian-proposed bans on ICBMs or SLBMs with non-nuclear warheads.

- As the United States stated in its non-paper of May 19, 2009, entitled "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty," non-nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs would not count toward the operationally deployed strategic nuclear warhead limits of the treaty.

- The United States believes that appropriate verification measures could be developed for such deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that nuclear warheads are not deployed on systems declared to be for non-nuclear use.

- As for the Russian Federation's suggestion that the term "warhead," as it is defined in the START Treaty, should be retained, the United States notes that, as was pointed out in the U.S. "Elements" paper of May 19, some terminology will need to be changed to meet the needs of the new treaty.

End text.

¶7. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of U.S. response to Ref G para 22 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On Security Guarantees for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the START Treaty (START) in connection with the Expiration of the Treaty," dated May 20, 2009

- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation paper from the May 20, 2009, meeting in Moscow "On Security Guarantees for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the START Treaty (START) in connection with the Expiration of the Treaty."

- The United States recognizes the interests and proposals that have been put forward by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine regarding extension of START, participation in the START Follow-on agreement, and obtaining reaffirmation of the security assurances provided in connection with their accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons States.

- In general, the United States agrees with the views expressed by the Russian Federation in its paper. Specifically, the United States agrees that the expiration of START does not affect the security assurances for Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine contained in the 1994 Budapest Memoranda.

- The United States believes it is important, however, to consider, together with the Russian Federation, approaches for recognizing the contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in the area of nuclear disarmament while also recognizing that the United States and Russian Federation remain firmly committed to the security assurances that they have already provided, and that the expiration of the START Treaty does not affect these assurances in any way.

- The United States is considering the Russian Federation's proposal to draft a joint Russian-U.S. statement. In the context of START expiration, such a statement could reaffirm the security assurances provided in 1994 to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

- In sum, the United States believes that it is necessary to address the interests and concerns expressed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in an approach that includes consultations between the United States and the Russian Federation. We look forward to continued consultations on this subject. This work should be conducted in parallel with our work on negotiating a bilateral agreement to replace the START Treaty, but it should not detract from it.

End text.

18. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of U.S. response to Ref G para 23 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On the Interrelationship between Strategic Offensive and Strategic Defensive Arms," dated May 19, 2009

- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation paper from the First Plenary meeting on May 19, 2009, in Moscow "On the Interrelationship between Strategic Offensive and Strategic Defensive Arms."

- The United States recognizes that the development of the new treaty concerning reductions and limitations in strategic offensive arms is directly tied to the national security interests of both the United States and the Russian Federation.

- The United States acknowledges that the Russian Federation has concerns regarding U.S. missile defense programs. The U.S. and Russia are addressing these concerns in a separate process.

- As the sides draft the text for the new treaty, the United States will be willing to consider language Russia may propose for the preamble that includes a general reference to this interrelationship on the understanding that this would be the only reference to defensive arms in the new treaty.

- The United States believes this reflects a practical approach for recognizing the interests of both countries within the parameters of a new treaty, the subject of which is reductions and limitations in strategic offensive arms, as agreed by our Presidents.

End text.

19. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of U.S. response to Ref G para 24 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Comments on the Russian Federation Paper "On the Intentions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Participate in Working out the New Agreement to Replace

the START Treaty," dated May 20, 2009

- The United States has reviewed your paper from the May 20, 2009, meeting in Moscow and again assures the Russian Federation that it has made clear to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine its intention to pursue a bilateral agreement with Russia on further reductions in our strategic nuclear forces.

- This commitment was confirmed in the April 1, 2009, joint statement issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in London.

- The United States notes that it is studying the Ukrainian non-paper, "Ukraine's position in connection with expiration of the Treaty," provided at JCIC-XXXIV in Geneva on June 10, 2009. We plan to respond to Ukraine through diplomatic channels. We would be interested in hearing the Russian Federation's views on this paper.

End text.

¶10. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of U.S. responses to Russian delegation questions presented in Ref H paper on June 2, 2009:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

Responses To Questions of the Russian Side in Connection with the U.S. Paper "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty" of May 19, 2009

Question 1. Paragraph (e) of Section I, General Obligations and Objectives," says that the U.S. seeks to work cooperatively with Russian Federation to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals as part of our efforts to "strengthen deterrence for both sides" (the original reads: "strengthen deterrence for both sides"; the translation received from the U.S. delegation reads: "strengthen mutual deterrence"). We would ask the U.S. to explain in greater detail exactly what it means here. Are we really talking about "mutual deterrence" or about deterrence in a "multilateral" context?

Answer. The primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to strengthen deterrence for both sides, and as we reduce the number of nuclear warheads, the reductions must not weaken our ability to deter but strengthen it on a global scale. The United States believes that strengthened deterrence for both sides will strengthen strategic stability. The United States looks forward to hearing Russia's views on this idea.

Question 2. In Subsection A of Section II, "Central Limits and Counting Rules," the U.S. anticipates that a "small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads" would not be considered to be operationally deployed. We would like to receive detailed explanations as to what portion of the total number of warheads could constitute the aforementioned "small number."

Answer. The United States continues to study this question and will provide a response at a later date.

Question 3. The same subsection provides for a "warhead limit" and goes on to say that "the central limit would be on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads." We would request clarification as to whether the U.S. side has in mind that besides the "central limit" on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, the new treaty could provide for some other limits on warheads, and if so, what warheads.

Answer. The U.S. answer to this question was provided in the U.S. non-paper on SNDV and ODSNW and the U.S.-proposed text of a joint understanding regarding the START Follow-on treaty. One limit would be on the aggregate

total of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each nation. The other limit would be on the aggregate total of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers for each nation.

Question 4. Why does the U.S. use different approaches to counting warheads on ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs) and on heavy bombers?

Answer. The U.S. side's approach is drawn directly from the way it is implementing the Moscow Treaty. The difference in treatment between ballistic missiles and bombers reflects a 1991 commitment the U.S. made and followed through on to remove heavy bombers from day-to-day alert status. Neither the U.S. nor Russia routinely maintains ODSNW loaded on their deployed heavy bombers. However, as SNDVs, deployed heavy bombers logically have associated ODSNW.

Question 4a. Specifically which facilities does the U.S. anticipate classifying as "a specified weapon storage area associated with or directly supporting a heavy bomber base" (Section II, Subsection A)?

Answer. The specified weapon storage areas (WSAs) would be agreed by the sides to identify WSA sites that would contain ODSNW for use by deployed heavy bombers. This would include specified WSAs containing such ODSNW that are collocated with the deployed heavy bombers at the same base, as well as specified WSAs containing such ODSNW that are located apart from the air base.

Question 5. In Subsection B of Section II, the U.S. proposes establishing limits on deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. We would request clarification as to the reason for this proposal, which provides for lumping together in the same limits deployed launchers for strategic delivery vehicles - ICBMs and SLBMs - and one of the types of delivery vehicles - heavy bombers.

Answer. The U.S. answer to this question was provided in the U.S. Non-paper on SNDV and ODSNW of June 12, 2009. For strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the U.S. approach would continue to use the START conventions for counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers (subject to agreed changes for non-nuclear delivery systems and to reduce costs of eliminating launcher systems).

Question 6. Subsection B of Section II contains the wording "ICBMs and SLBMs tested for nuclear weapon delivery." We would ask you to clarify the specifics of this wording, taking into account that according to the understanding between the Parties at the time the START Treaty was concluded, all their ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers subject to the Treaty are nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Does the U.S. side have in mind producing and testing new types of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration?

Answer. The United States believes the START Follow-on Treaty should limit ODSNWs and SNDVs, and the U.S.-proposed arms control measures would apply to these systems. A system specifically developed for and tested for non-nuclear use will not be subject to treaty limits.

Question 7. We would ask you to provide a more detailed explanation as to what is meant by launchers "that are no longer capable of supporting operational ICBMs or SLBMs." What are the criteria the U.S. side intends to use to define the transfer of a launcher into this category? What are the criteria for "considerable time and expense"?

Answer. The U.S. answer to these questions was provided in the U.S. Non-paper on SNDV and ODSNW of June 12, 2009.

Specific proposals may be captured under Conversion or Elimination text to be provided during negotiations.

Question 8. In the context of Subsection D of Section II, which deals with "deployment of non-nuclear warheads," the following question arises: do technical methods of verification exist which would make it possible to guarantee that the other Party could identify that a reentry vehicle in flight is conventionally armed?

Answer. The United States believes that appropriate verification measures could be developed for such deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that nuclear warheads are not deployed on systems declared to be for non-nuclear use. These verification measures would not be intended to apply to the discrimination of ICBMs or SLBMs in flight. The United States believes that the sides could explore ways in which special launch notifications and related measures could mitigate Russian concerns.

Question 9. In the context of Subsection E of Section II, which deals with terminology: Is a definition of the term "new type," for example, necessary if the new treaty does not provide for limitations applicable to ICBMs and SLBMs?

Answer. The terms that will apply in the new treaty will be subject to negotiation. The United States presumes some terms from START would be carried forward and may require modification or adaptation.

Question 10. In Section IV, "Elimination," elimination procedures for only silo launchers of ICBMs and heavy bombers are cited as examples of elimination procedures. Does the U.S. side have in mind that in the new treaty the application of elimination procedures would be limited specifically to silo launchers and heavy bombers?

Answer. The examples cited by the United States - silo launchers of ICBMs and heavy bombers - are illustrative but not necessarily complete. The U.S. side does not exclude the possibility of simpler and less expensive elimination procedures for all SNDVs.

Question 11. Section V, "Notifications, Monitoring, and Verification," proposes retaining and adapting, "as appropriate," the main START Treaty provisions concerning data exchange, notifications, and inspections. We would request clarification as to how the U.S. side intends to accomplish this task, given its approach that provides for rejecting the reduction and limitation of an aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Answer. The U.S. approach is to limit both SNDVs and ODSNW. We propose retaining or adapting, as necessary, START provisions concerning data exchange, notifications, and inspections consistent with this approach. This is a subject for discussion within the negotiations.

Question 12. Subsection C of Section V, which deals with verification, proposes adapting relevant START Treaty provisions for new treaty's requirements. Since the U.S. position does not provide for reduction and limitation of the aggregate number of ICBMs, a question arises as to whether verification of ICBMs and SLBMs is necessary, especially in view of the fact that Russian ICBMs and SLBMs are maintained, stored, and transported either as assembled missiles without launch canisters or as assembled missiles in launch canisters, while U.S. missiles are maintained, stored, and transported in stages of such missiles.

Answer. The U.S. approach is to limit both SNDVs and ODSNW. As such, many START verification provisions remain applicable. This is a subject for discussion within the negotiations.

Question 12a. And if ICBMs and SLBMs are subject to verification, as the U.S. side proposes, then in that case

what should be the goal of verification, given that counting of ICBMs and SLBMs is not envisaged?

Answer. As stated in the answer to question 3, the other limit, in addition to an ODSNW limit, would be on the aggregate total of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers for each side. The goal of verification is to verify that the aggregate number of ICBMs and their associated launchers, SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers does not exceed the agreed limit. The U.S. Non-paper on SNDV and ODSNW of June 12, 2009 clarifies that for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the U.S. approach would continue to use the START conventions for counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers.

Question 12b. In this context a question also arises as to the advisability of conducting exhibitions to confirm the relevant technical characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs and exchanging telemetric information in connection with flight tests of these missiles -- in the absence of any qualitative limitations for these strategic delivery vehicles.

Answer. Exhibitions are valuable transparency and confidence building measures that afford a side the opportunity to observe that the declared relationship between an ICBM or SLBM and its associated launcher is accurate.

Question 13. Questions concerning Section VIII. In the U.S. version, the duration of the Treaty is defined as 5-10 years. It is anticipated that the new levels will be reached in 3-5 years. Does the U.S. side envisage establishing a strict time line for phasing -- if phasing is provided for -- as is done in the START Treaty?

Answer. The U.S. side does not envisage a strict timeline for phasing periods. In addition, the U.S. does not object to the Russian-proposed seven year reduction period.

End text.
CLINTON